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Arbitration is a private-sector court.1 Rather than litigating in a government court (in which a judge or jury resolves the dispute), many parties form contracts 
obligating themselves to have their disputes resolved by an 
arbitrator. Th e arbitrator’s decision in such a case, typically 
called an arbitration “award,” can be enforced in court. To do 
this, the party that won in arbitration can get a court order 
“confi rming” the arbitration award.2 “A confi rmed award in 
favor of the plaintiff  (or ‘claimant’) is enforced in the same 
manner as other court judgments,”3 and an arbitration award in 
favor of the defendant precludes the plaintiff  from reasserting in 
court the claim the plaintiff  lost in arbitration.4 So arbitration 
awards are generally fi nal and binding.
A court’s main alternative to confi rming an arbitration 
award is to vacate it, but courts do not vacate arbitration awards 
very often.5 Th is is largely because the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA),6 which governs nearly all arbitration in the United 
States,7 contains narrow grounds for vacatur. Section 10(a) of 
the FAA says a court may vacate an award:  
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, 
or undue means. 
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them. 
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon suffi  cient cause 
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. 
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
defi nite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made.8
Importantly, the FAA’s grounds for vacating arbitration 
awards do not include “error of law” by the arbitrator. Courts 
generally do not review whether the arbitrator’s decision correctly 
applied the law, and “courts have directly acknowledged that 
‘[a]rbitrators are not bound by rules of law.’”9 However, courts 
may be uncomfortable confi rming arbitration awards that 
misapply the law. Perhaps for this reason, courts have gone 
beyond the FAA’s statutory grounds for vacatur to create two 
additional grounds for vacatur. Under these two judicially-
created grounds, “an arbitration award may be vacated if (1) 
the arbitrator ‘manifestly disregarded’ applicable law, or (2) 
enforcement of the arbitration award would violate ‘public 
policy.’”10
In addition, some courts have enforced contractually-
created grounds for vacating arbitration awards. For example, 
a panel of the Ninth Circuit enforced an arbitration agreement 
providing that “[t]he Court shall vacate, modify or correct any 
award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in the 
Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators’ fi ndings of 
fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) where 
the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are erroneous.”11 Such clauses 
are apparently motivated by parties’ fear of a “knucklehead” 
arbitration award being confi rmed under the FAA’s narrow 
grounds of vacatur.12 Th is fear leads some parties to try to add 
(by contract) additional grounds for vacatur to enable courts to 
better police the legal accuracy of arbitrator’s rulings.
Th e Supreme Court, however, rejected such contractually-
created grounds for vacatur in the 2008 case of Hall Street 
Associates v. Mattel.13 In Hall Street, the Supreme Court stated 
that the FAA’s four grounds for vacatur are “exclusive.”14 Th e 
Court viewed the FAA’s provisions on confi rmation and vacatur 
of arbitration awards 
as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with 
just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s 
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any 
other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and 
evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitration 
merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-
consuming judicial review process and bring arbitration 
theory to grief in post-arbitration process.15
Th is rationale, along with Hall Street’s statement that the FAA’s 
four grounds for vacatur are “exclusive,” has led some courts 
and commentators to conclude that Hall Street does away with 
not only contractually-created grounds for vacatur, but also a 
judicially-created one, the “manifest disregard of law” doctrine.16 
By contrast, other courts continue to use the manifest disregard 
doctrine to vacate awards, even after Hall Street.17
Th e manifest disregard doctrine is traced to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan,18 which stated (in dicta) 
that “interpretations of the law by arbitrators in contrast to 
manifest disregard are not subject . . . to judicial review for 
error in interpretation.”19 Th is statement might be read to say 
that, although courts should not overrule arbitrators who try 
to apply the law but make an error in doing so, courts should 
overrule arbitrators who refuse even to try to apply the law. And 
lower courts applying Wilko’s manifest disregard doctrine often 
summarize it as permitting vacatur if “the arbitrators appreciated 
the existence and applicability of a controlling legal rule but 
intentionally decided not to apply it.”20
Wilko and the manifest disregard doctrine were relied 
upon by the petitioner in Hall Street. As the Supreme Court 
explained:
Authorities Split After the Supreme Court’s HALL STREET Decision: What Is 
Left of the Manifest Disregard Doctrine?
By Stephen J. Ware* & Marisa C. Maleck**
............................................................
* Stephen J. Ware is a Professor of Law at the University of Kansas and 
faculty advisor to the KU chapter of the Federalist Society.
** Marisa C. Maleck is a second year student at the University of Chicago 
Law School and a student liaison to the Federalism/Separation of Powers 
and Litigation Practice Groups’ Executive Committees of the Federalist 
Society.
120  Engage: Volume 11, Issue 1
Hall Street [the petitioner] reads [Wilko] as recognizing 
“manifest disregard of the law” as a further ground for 
vacatur on top of those listed in § 10, and some Circuits 
have read it the same way. Hall Street sees this supposed 
addition to § 10 as the camel’s nose: if judges can add 
grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting 
parties.
But this is too much for Wilko to bear. Quite apart from its 
leap from a supposed judicial expansion by interpretation 
to a private expansion by contract, Hall Street overlooks the 
fact that the statement it relies on expressly rejects just what 
Hall Street asks for here, general review for an arbitrator’s 
legal errors. Th en there is the vagueness of Wilko’s phrasing. 
Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name 
a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to 
the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. 
Or, as some courts have thought, “manifest disregard” 
may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the 
subsections authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were 
“guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their powers.” We, 
when speaking as a Court, have merely taken the Wilko 
language as we found it, without embellishment, and now 
that its meaning is implicated, we see no reason to accord 
it the signifi cance that Hall Street urges.21
Th is passage has left uncertainty in its wake.
Courts and commentators have split three ways on Hall 
Street’s implications for the manifest disregard doctrine. One 
approach is that the manifest disregard doctrine is dead, killed 
by Hall Street,22 so courts must now confi rm arbitration awards 
that manifestly disregard the law. At the other extreme, some 
courts treat the manifest disregard doctrine as though it was 
unaff ected by Hall Street; in these courts, “manifest disregard 
of the law” remains a judicially-created ground for vacatur 
in addition to the four statutory grounds found for vacatur 
found in the text of the FAA.23 A third group of courts takes an 
intermediate position. In these courts, the manifest disregard 
doctrine survives, but not as an independent, judicially-created 
ground for vacatur. Rather, the manifest disregard doctrine is 
folded into FAA Section 10(a)(4), so arbitrators who manifestly 
disregard the law are held to have “exceeded their powers”; thus 
the statutory ground for vacatur is triggered.24
Th is three-way split of authority may not last. As more 
appellate courts have a chance to address Hall Street’s impact 
on the manifest disregard doctrine, they may converge on a 
single view. If not, the law may remain unsettled enough for 
the Supreme Court to take another arbitration case in order to 
clarify the status of the manifest disregard doctrine. Of course, 
Congress could amend the FAA to provide this clarifi cation,25 
and one of us has proposed statutory language to do so.26 But 
until the law is clarifi ed, litigants seeking to vacate arbitration 
awards increase their chances by casting their manifest disregard 
arguments as arguments under FAA §10(a)(4), rather than as 
arguments relying on a judicially-created ground for vacatur.27 
Of course, litigants defending arbitration awards against 
manifest disregard arguments can argue that the arbitrator did 
not manifestly disregard the law and, even if she did, arbitrators 
have every right to manifestly disregard the law. In sum, we still 
do not know whether arbitrators must try to apply the law or 
else have their awards vacated. A strikingly important gap in 
arbitration law remains.
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